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Gaze patterns disclose the link between cognitive reflection and
sophistication in strategic interaction
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Abstract
In social contexts, we refer to strategic sophistication as the ability to adapt our own behavior based on the possible actions of
others. In the current study, we explore the role of other-oriented attention and cognitive reflection in explaining heterogeneity
in strategic sophistication. In two eye-tracking experiments, we registered eye movements of participants while playing matrix
games of increasing relational complexity (2x2 and 3x3 matrices), and we analyzed individual gaze patterns to reveal the
ongoing mechanisms of integration of own and others’ incentives in the current game representation. Moreover, participants
completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), in addition to alternative measures of cognitive ability. In both classes of
games, higher cognitive reflection levels specifically predict the ability to incorporate the counterpart’s incentives in the current
model of the game, as well as higher levels of strategic sophistication. Conversely, players exhibiting low cognitive reflection
tend to pay less attention to relevant transitions between the counterpart’s payoffs, and such incomplete visual analysis leads
to out-of-equilibrium choices. Gaze patterns appear to completely mediate the relationship between cognitive reflection and
strategic choices. Our results shed new light on the cognitive factors driving heterogeneity in strategic thinking and on theories
of bounded rationality.
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1 Introduction
In our everyday experience, we often face situations in which
the outcome of our decisions is influenced by the decisions
of other agents. In this context, it is important to understand
others’ goals and intentions to predict their actions, an abil-
ity that is referred to as “mentalizing” or “Theory of Mind”
(ToM, Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Nonetheless, accumu-
lating experimental evidence has shown that agents are often
non-strategic. They also deviate from the Nash equilibrium
strategies (Grosskopf & Nagel, 2008), which postulate per-
fect self-interested rationality of players that have consistent
beliefs about others’ behavior and select the best action given
their expectations (Mailath, 1998).
In order to account for the heterogeneity observed in inter-
active games, behavioral models of strategic thinking such
as Level-K (Crawford, 2003; Crawford et al., 2013; Nagel,
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1995; Stahl & Wilson, 1995) and Cognitive Hierarchy (CH,
Camerer et al, 2004; Chong et al., 2016; Ho et al., 1998)
allowed more flexibility in players’ beliefs, modelling be-
havior in terms of hierarchical levels of strategic thinking
(Nagel, 1995). These models describe the strategy space of
players building a hierarchical structure that predicts, at the
bottom, players who play randomly (level-0). The second
step in the hierarchy corresponds to level-1 players, who best
respond to the belief that the counterparts are level-0; the fol-
lowing step predicts level-2 players, who best respond to the
belief that the opponents are level-1 (in Level-k theory) or
a mixture between level-0 and level-1 (in Cognitive Hierar-
chy theory), and so on, increasing the number of steps of
strategic thinking. Behavioral models of strategic thinking
therefore assume that each player has to estimate the level
of rationality of the other agents involved in the interaction
(Pantelis & Kennedy, 2017).
These models offer an elegant description of the hetero-
geneity observed in interactive decisions, but do not provide
a cognitive explanation of the factors modulating this vari-
ability. For instance, it is not clear if agents applying few
steps of strategic thinking believe that the other players are
boundedly rational and therefore best-respond to this belief,
or whether they are boundedly rational themselves (Goodie
et al., 2012; Grosskopf and Nagel, 2008). In this regard, one
of the crucial components of mentalizing concerns the con-
structions of an exhaustive and correct mental model of the
decision space of the counterpart, in order to predict her next
action and therefore best-respond to it (Hedden & Zhang,
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2002). However, some experimental evidence suggests that
deviations from normative responses in strategic interaction
depend on poor game representations. These misrepresenta-
tions may arise from the generation of a miserly model of the
opponent’s incentives and potential moves (Verbrugge et al.,
2018), the relational structure of the game payoffs (Devetag
& Warglien, 2008), or the relationships between own and
other’s potential actions and outcomes (Rydval et al., 2009).
In other words, if agents do not incorporate specific chunks
of information (e.g., the incentives of the opponent) in their
model of the strategic environment, or if they integrate them
inaccurately with other available information, they would be
unlikely to achieve optimal game solutions (Kreps, 1990).
1.1 Gaze patterns and game representation
Given the importance of mechanisms of information en-
coding and representation in strategic interaction, process-
tracing research has recently explored processes of game
(mis)representation by observing the patterns of information
acquisition characterizing game playing. Costa-Gomes et
al. (2001) used mouse-tracking to disclose the processes of
information search in normal form games, identifying nine
strategic types of player. A relevant proportion of these
participants exhibited choices and information acquisition
patterns consistent with predictions of level-k models. Hris-
tova & Grinberg (2005) showed that cooperative behavior
in a Prisoner Dilemma (PD) game was linked to the distri-
bution of attention between payoffs matrix and opponent’s
moves. In two mouse-tracking experiments, Brocas et al.
(2014, 2018) showed that failure to look at required pieces
of information predicts out-of-equilibrium play in private
information games (Brocas et al., 2014) and sequential and
simultaneous dominance solvable games of complete infor-
mation (Brocas et al., 2018).
Polonio et al. (2015) used eye-tracking to cluster par-
ticipants in types of player depending on their frequency
distribution of classes of transitions connecting matrix pay-
offs. The cluster analysis returned three categories of player:
1) players focusing on their own payoffs, 2) players mostly
performing intra-cell comparisons, and 3) players with dis-
tributed attention. The two former types did not perform the
payoff comparisons necessary for individuating the equilib-
rium strategy. In particular, players focusing on own payoffs
did not incorporate the possible actions of the opponent in
their decision model and chose in accordance to the expected
strategy of a Level-1 (L1) player, who responds to the belief
that the opponent does not have a preferred action. Players
that focused on intra-cell comparisons did considered oppo-
nents’ payoffs, but framed the problem as a pure coordina-
tion game, disregarding dominant choices of the opponent.
In contrast, both visual analysis and choices of the latter
type of player were consistent with the expected behavior
of a Level-2 (L2) player, who assumes that the counter-
part is a L1 player and, given such belief, best responds to
the expected counterpart’s action.1 Altogether, these results
suggest that some players systematically misrepresent and
simplify interactive problems by disregarding those payoff
comparisons that are necessary for mentalizing and strategic
thinking. Importantly, game misrepresentation leads to devi-
ation from game-theoretical equilibrium choices, supporting
the idea that the internal representation of the game structure
is a crucial component of the interactive decision process.
1.2 Cognitive abilities, game representation
and strategic sophistication
Recent experimental research has asked whether specific
cognitive factors could explain individual differences in
strategic sophistication. Several studies have indeed shown
correlations between behavior in games and different mea-
sures of cognitive ability and executive functions (Burks et
al., 2009; Burnham et al., 2009; Gill & Prowse, 2016).
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) has
been particularly successful in explaining choices in several
interactive games, including the Beauty Contest Game (Car-
penter et al., 2013; Fehr & Huck 2016; Brañas-Garza et al.,
2012), the Hit 15 game (Carpenter et al., 2013), bank-run
games (Kiss et al., 2016) and matrix games (Georganas et
al., 2015; Hanaki et al. 2016). The CRT assesses individ-
ual differences in cognitive style: particularly the tendency
to rely more on either reflective or intuitive cognitive pro-
cesses (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Baron et al., 2014; Mata
et al., 2013; Szaszi et al., 2017). High cognitive reflection
levels have also been linked to the tendency to use more thor-
ough search processes (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Cokely et al.,
2009) and to the ability to accurately process and represent
task-relevant information (Mata et al., 2014; Sirota et al.,
2014). Moreover, the CRT is related to analytical thinking
(Hoppe & Kusterer, 2011), behavioral biases (Oechssler et
al., 2009), probabilistic reasoning (Koehler & James, 2010;
Liberali et al., 2012) and rule abstraction (Don et al., 2016).
Conversely, a low cognitive reflection level is associated with
miserly information processing (Toplak et al., 2014). Taken
together, these findings indicate involvement of cognitive re-
flection in the processes of information encoding, integration
and representation underlying judgment and decision mak-
ing tasks. In the context of strategic interaction, we therefore
hypothesize that cognitive reflection may specifically modu-
late mechanisms of information processing underlying game
representation, which in turn predict the level of sophistica-
tion in strategic interaction.
To test this hypothesis, we conducted two eye-tracking
experiments involving matrix games between two players.
Matrix games consist in a set of incentives (i.e., payoffs) and
1Concerning the relationship between Level-k models and gaze data, see
also Stewart et al. (2016) who showed inconsistencies between patterns of
information acquisition and Level-k or Cognitive Hierarchy models.
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an action set for each player: the combination of players’
decisions therefore determines their respective outcomes.
Games were one-shot, meaning that participants did not re-
ceive any feedback about the action of the opponent and
the game outcome after their choice in each game. In Ex-
periment 1 participants played 2x2 matrix games, while in
Experiment 2 we increased game complexity introducing
3x3 matrices. Experiment 2 was designed to explore the
generalizability of the effect of cognitive reflection on game
play, and investigate whether game complexity could affect
the hypothesized relationship between cognitive reflection
and game representation. We analyzed participants’ gaze
patterns to reveal the type of game representation that they
were building, and administered the Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT) to obtain individual measures of cognitive reflec-
tion. Additional measures of fluid intelligence and working
memory abilities were collected to investigate the cognitive
specificity of the role of cognitive reflection in modulating
game representation processes and strategic sophistication.
Both experiments are based on the same analysis structure.
First, we tested whether cognitive reflection predicts strate-
gic choices and hierarchical levels of strategic thinking in
games. Second, we explored the relationship between game
representation and strategic behavior by looking for gaze pat-
terns of information acquisition that could predict the level
of sophistication in strategic choices. Third, we explored the
relationship between patterns of information acquisition and
cognitive reflection. Finally, we tested whether gaze pat-




2.1.1 Participants and procedure
Participants were 48 students from the University of Trento,
Italy (34 females, mean age 23.02, SD 2.84). The study was
approved by the local ethics committee and all participants
gave informed consent. Participants performed thirty-two
2x2 one-shot matrix games. Before playing the games, they
were instructed on the procedure and were provided with
examples and training trials (4 games). Moreover, we ad-
ministered control questions to participants to verify that they
have fully understood task and procedure of payment. If par-
ticipants failed to answer control questions, instructions were
repeated (detailed instructions and control questionnaires are
reported in section C.1 of the Appendices). All participants
played in the role of row player2 and were instructed to
2In order to pair each participant with an opponent, the 32 games con-
sisted of 16 pairs of isomorphic games in which row and column payoffs
were identical but switched; in such a way, it was possible to match the
choices of two row players as they have played in two different roles.
choose between row I and row II by key-press. The order of
games was randomized for each participant. Each game was
played only once and no feedback was provided at the end of
games. Trials were preceded by a fixation-point positioned
in one of four possible locations outside the matrix. At the
end of the experimental session, three games were randomly
selected and the player’s choice in each game was paired
with the choice of another player in that very same game.
Participants received the sum of the outcomes of the three
games in euros (from 3 to 27 euros).
In addition to 2x2 games, all participants took the Cog-
nitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) and additional
cognitive tests of fluid intelligence and working memory in
order to test the specificity of the effect of cognitive reflec-
tion. Fluid intelligence was assessed using a time-limited
version (Schmittmann, 2006) of the Raven Advanced Pro-
gressive Matrices Test (APM; Raven et al., 1998). Working
memory measures included digit span forward and backward
(Wechsler, 2008) and the n-back task (Kirchner et al., 1958).
Forward digit span measures abilities in simple short-term
maintenance and recall of digits, while the backward span
requires an additional component of mental manipulation of
elements (Baddeley, 1996; Monaco et al., 2013). The n-
back task assesses the ability to actively maintain and update
information in working memory, and targets mechanisms
linked to executive control such as inhibition and interfer-
ence resolution (Kane et al., 2007). We report the exact
procedure of these control cognitive tests in section A.1 of
the Appendices.
2.1.2 2x2 Matrix games
In the current work, we used games characterized by a unique
game theoretical optimal solution, which is commonly de-
scribed using the concept of Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950).
Nash equilibrium is a game solution in which none of the
players has a self-interested incentive to deviate from its
own strategy after considering the counterpart’s choice. In
Experiment 1, we used a particular class of game called
dominance-solvable. These games contain an option which
is better than another one for a player, independently of the
action the counterpart will take. We refer to this option as a
dominant strategy.3 In Experiment 1, we used two classes of
dominance-solvable games characterized by different equi-
librium structures, creating sixteen 2x2 games for each class
(for a full list of game matrices, see Figure A1 in section A.1,
Appendices). The two classes of games (Figure 1) were: (1)
dominance solvable “self” games (DSS), in which only the
participant had a strictly dominant strategy; (2) dominance
solvable “other” games (DSO), in which only the opponent
had a strictly dominant strategy.
3Since dominant strategies in our games dominate every alternative
option of one of the players, they are additionally referred to as strictly
dominant.
















Dominance solvable self (DSS) Dominance solvable other (DSO)
Figure 1: Examples of dominance solvable self (DSS) and
dominance solvable other (DSO) games. All participants
played in the role of row players. In this example, we report
two isomorphic games in which row and column payoffs are
identical but switched. The line in one of the cells of each
matrix signals the equilibrium solution of the game. Taking
the perspective of a row player, the DSS game shown in the
current figure contains a strictly dominant strategy (option I):
in fact, it returns a higher payoff than option II independently
of the column player’s choice. Given this dominant strategy,
the column player optimizes its payoff by choosing option ii.
In the DSO game, the column player has a strictly dominant
strategy (option ii) and the row player would best respond by
choosing option II. The black lines represent Nash equilibria.
Both types of dominance-solvable game had a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium that always coincide with level-
2 play in hierarchical models of strategic thinking. DSO
games differ from DSS games because the equilibrium so-
lution requires two steps of iterated elimination of dominant
strategies that include the evaluation of the counterpart’s
incentives (first, individuating the strict dominance of the
counterpart; second, choosing the best response given the
opponent’s dominant choice). In contrast, the equilibrium
solution in DSS games needs only one step of iterated elimi-
nation of dominant strategies between participant’s own pos-
sible choices and therefore does not even require the evalu-
ation of the counterpart’s incentives. For this reason, only
DSO games require strategic sophistication for the equilib-
rium strategy. Games within a class could vary in terms
of magnitude of payoffs and location of the payoffs in the
matrix, but maintained the described relations of dominance
between choices.
2.1.3 Eye-tracking procedure
While playing matrix games, participants were seated in a
chair with a soft head restraint to ensure a viewing distance of
55 cm. from a monitor with 1920 x 1080 resolution. Presen-
tation of the stimuli was performed using a custom-made pro-
gram implemented using Matlab Psychtoolbox. Eye move-
ments were monitored and recorded using a tower mounted
Eyelink 2000 system (SR. Research Ontario Canada) with
a sampling rate of 2000 Hz. In matrix games, we used a
calibration with 13 points: points were placed in the exact
locations of payoffs, at the center of the matrix and in the four
possible locations of the fixation cross. After the calibration
phase, a validation phase was performed to make sure that
the calibration was accurate. The position of points in the
validation phase was identical to the one in the calibration
phase. Re-calibrations and re-validation were performed if
these had been unsuccessful. Before the beginning of each
trial, a drift correction was performed in order to control
that participants look at the current fixation location; stim-
uli were presented after the fixation point was fixated for
300 milliseconds. Stimuli were placed at an optimal dis-
tance between each other in order to precisely distinguish
goal-directed saccades and fixations.
2.1.4 Gaze data analysis
Following the eye-tracking analysis performed by Polonio
and colleagues (2015), we defined eight regions of interest
(ROIs), centered on the matrix payoffs. All the ROIs had a
circular shape with a size of 36000 pixels. The ROIs covered
only 23% of the game matrix area and did not overlap. All
the fixations that did not fall within any ROIs were discarded.
However, although a consistent portion of the matrix was not
included in any of the ROIs, the large majority of fixations
(87.4%) were located inside the ROIs.
We focused on two main types of gaze data analysis: fix-
ation and transition analysis.4
On the one hand, fixation analysis can reveal with ex-
tremely high accuracy which piece of information is being
processed in a specific time unit (De Neys & Osman, 2013).
In the current experiment, fixation analysis was useful to ex-
plore, for each player, the distribution of attention between
own and other’s payoffs, revealing in what measure players
incorporate others’ incentives in their model of the interac-
tive problem.
On the other hand, transitions express eye movements
(i.e., saccades) from one payoff (AOI) to the next. Saccades
are generally thought to reflect a direct an obligatory conse-
quence of overt attentional shifts (e.g., Deubel & Schneider,
1996; He & Kowler, 1992; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995).
These top-down attentional shifts occur when the processing
of the attended item reaches some critical level, triggering
the visual system to prepare a motor program enabling a sac-
cade towards the next target (De Neys & Osman, 2013). In
the context of matrix games, transitions specifically provide
information about the pieces of information that participants
were comparing and therefore incorporating in their model
of the interactive problem. In particular, we considered those
transitions that were useful to extract information about the
structure of the payoff matrix and build a representation of
4A fixation was defined as an interval in which gaze was focused within
1◦ of visual angle for at least 100 ms (Manor and Gordon, 2003).

















Figure 2: Relevant types of transitions between payoffs. The
direction of the transition from one payoff to the other is irrel-
evant for classification.
the current game.5 In order to explore the type of visual
analysis performed by participants, transitions were divided
in five major types (Figure 2), following the classification of
Devetag and colleagues (2016):
1) own-payoffs within-action transitions: transitions be-
tween player’s own payoffs within a single row (necessary to
identify the action with the highest average payoff).
2) own-payoffs between-action transitions: transitions be-
tween player’s own payoffs within a single column (necessary
to identify the presence of own dominant choices).
3) other-payoffs within-action transitions: transitions be-
tween the counterpart’s payoffs within a single column (nec-
essary to identify the counterpart’s choice with the highest
average payoff).
4) other-payoffs between-action transitions: transitions
between the counterpart’s payoffs within a single row (nec-
essary to identify the presence of counterpart’s dominant
choices).
5) intra-cell transitions: transitions between the payoffs
of the two players, within the same cell (necessary to com-
pare the two players’ payoffs given a specific combination of
choices).
2.2 Hypotheses
In Experiment 1, we asked whether cognitive reflection
modulates attentional mechanisms underlying representation
building, as expressed by gaze patterns, and individual lev-
els of strategic sophistication in 2x2 games. Behaviorally,
5Other types of transitions that are excluded from this classification (e.g.
transitions connecting own and other’s payoffs across cells) do not allow
to extract relevant information about the payoff structure (see for instance
Devetag et al., 2016). We acknowledge that the proportion of these type
of “non-useful” transitions is rather high (48.09%), since they are geo-
metrically necessary to perform the scan paths necessary to extract relevant
information about the game structure. However, the implementation of these
types of transitions is not linked to the proportion of equilibrium responses
neither in DSS (Spearman’s rank correlation, r = −0.08, p = 0.59) nor in
DSO (r = −0.07, p = 0.65) games, confirming that they do not constitute
relevant payoff-comparisons allowing the extraction relevant information
for game resolution.
we expect high CRT players to show higher levels of strate-
gic thinking (i.e., level-2) in the framework of the Cognitive
Hierarchy model. High CRT players should therefore play
more often the equilibrium strategy, which is optimal (in our
2x2 games) in response to a typical population whose strate-
gic level ranges between level-1 and level-2 (Camerer et al.,
2004). This behavioral effect should emerge in DSO games,
which require strategic sophistication and can reveal choice
differences between players characterized by different levels
of strategic thinking (e.g. level-1 and level-2).
At the same time, we expect the CRT score to predict so-
phistication in the visual analysis of the game matrix. We
do not predict differences between DSS and DSO games,
since previous results (Polonio et al., 2015) have shown that
the visual analysis of game matrices is consistent across
classes of games: this hypothesis is in line with the idea
that the visual analysis of the game matrix is controlled by
a top-down modulation of attention. We hypothesize high
CRT players to exhibit the typical gaze patterns of more
sophisticated types of players (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001;
Devetag et al., 2016; Polonio et al., 2015; Polonio & Cori-
celli, 2019). In particular, high CRT players should make a
higher proportion of other-payoff within-action transitions,
suggesting the attempt to form precise (non-diffuse) beliefs
about the expected action of the counterpart, and to iden-
tify the counterpart’s action with the highest average payoff.
This is consistent with the expected behavior of a level-2
player that aims to best respond to the predicted action of
a level-1 player (Bhatt & Camerer, 2005; Costa-Gomes et
al., 2001). On the contrary, we expect low CRT players to
rely on a less exhaustive game representation that does not
incorporate the evaluation of other’s incentives to predict
her move and therefore implement recursive strategic think-
ing. Finally, we hypothesize that the relationship between
CRT score and strategic choices is mediated by the level of
sophistication of the visual analysis of the payoff matrix.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Behavioral results
As expected, the proportion of equilibrium responses in DSO
games is significantly lower than in DSS games (DSS: M =
0.85, SD = 0.17; DSO: M = 0.56, SD = 0.22, Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-rank test, z = 5.21, effect size (r) =
0.75, p < .001). These results confirm that heterogeneity
in strategic sophistication emerges in those games in which
taking into account the possible incentives of others is fun-
damental.
2.3.2 Cognitive reflection and strategic sophistication
First, we investigated the relationship between cognitive re-
flection and the proportion of Nash equilibrium choices in
DSO games, where strategic sophistication is required to
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Table 1: For each CRT group, we report the parameter g
(CH), which expresses the average group level of strategic
thinking in the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model, and the av-
erage proportion of equilibrium responses in DSS and DSO
games (standard deviations in brackets).
Proportion of equilibrium responses
CRT
score
N g (CH) DSS DSO
0 14 1 0.78 (0.19) 0.48 (0.18)
1 10 1.6 0.88 (0.13) 0.58 (0.18)
2 14 1.32 0.88 (0.14) 0.50 (0.23)
3 10 2.26 0.86 (0.18) 0.74 (0.21)
find the optimal solution. In order to evaluate the specificity
of the effect of cognitive reflection on strategic choices, we
ran a stepwise backward regression (Draper & Smith, 1998;
Efroymson, 1960; Hocking, 1976) on the average proportion
of equilibrium responses in DSO games including the CRT
score, the Raven score and the three measures of working
memory as independent variables.6 Results indicate that
the model that best predicts the proportion of equilibrium
choices included only the CRT score (R2 = .11, F (1, 46) =
5.59, B = 0.33, p = .022), while we did not find any effect of
fluid intelligence or working memory on strategic behavior
(Variables excluded from the model: Raven score, digit span
forward, digit span backward, n-back score: p > .05).7 As
expected, cognitive reflection does not affect the proportion
of equilibrium responses in DSS games (B = 0.06, p = .709),
where strategic sophistication is not needed.8 These results
highlight the crucial role of cognitive reflection in strategic
thinking.
Then we tested whether the CRT score was associated
with the level of strategic thinking predicted by the Cognitive
Hierarchy (CH) model, which describes interactive behavior
by a hierarchy of decision rules differing in the number (k)
of steps of thinking used. In CH, the frequency distribution
f (k) of steps of players is assumed to be Poisson, and its
mean and variance is described by a single parameter g.
The higher the g of a population, the higher its level of
6See Table A1 in section A.3, Appendices, for a correlation table be-
tween the collected individual cognitive measures.
7We found the same results after removing from the model highly in-
fluential observations (= 5) with values of Cook’s D > 4/n (CRT score: R2
= .18, F (1, 41) = 9.01, B = 0.34, p = 0.005. Variables excluded from the
model: Raven score, digit span forward, digit span backward, n-back score:
p > .05).
8We found an effect of the n-back score on the proportion of equilibrium
responses in DSS games (B = 0.23, p = .022), but this effect did not reach
significance after excluding from the model highly influential observations
(= 3) with values of Cook’s D > 4/n (N-back score: B = 0.26, p = 0.081).
All the other measures of working memory and fluid intelligence were not















































































DSS games DSO games
Figure 3: Boxplots of proportion of equilibrium choices in
DSS and DSO games by CRT score.
strategic sophistication. Therefore, we estimated g for each
of our CRT groups, expecting the value of g to increase
along with the CRT level. As expected, the higher the CRT
level, the higher the free parameter g (CRT = 0, g = 1; CRT
= 1, g = 1.6; CRT = 2, g = 1.32; CRT = 3, g = 2.26).
Interestingly, players with CRT = 0 exhibit a g parameter
which expresses the expected behavior of a L1 player, while
players with CRT = 3 have a g parameter reflecting the
strategy of a L2 player. Players with CRT = 1 and CRT = 2
lie in between these two levels of strategic behavior. Results
of the CH model estimation show that cognitive reflection is
indeed associated with level of strategic thinking in our 2x2
games. In Table 1, for each CRT level, we report the group
level of strategic thinking (g) and the average proportion of
equilibrium responses. Figure 3 shows boxplots of average
proportion of equilibrium responses for each CRT level in
DSS and DSO games.
Moreover, we tested whether higher CRT levels are as-
sociated with higher earnings. Specifically, we calculated
the ‘Strategic IQ’, defined as the magnitude of the expected
payoffs of players given the frequency distribution of actual
choices of potential opponents (Bhatt & Camerer, 2005). In
other words, the Strategic IQ expresses the optimality of a
strategy given the actual distribution of strategies among po-
tential opponents in the population. Results of a regression
with Strategic IQ as dependent variable and CRT as inde-
pendent variable reveal that CRT score is associated with
the Strategic IQ (R2 = .17, F (1, 46) = 9.42, B = 0.41, p =
.004), suggesting that players with high cognitive reflection
use a strategy that is more efficient given the actual distri-
bution of level of strategic thinking in the pool (Figure 4).
Taken together, these results highlight a robust link between
cognitive reflection and strategic sophistication.
2.3.3 Gaze patterns and choices
First, we tested whether the visual analysis of the game ma-
trix is dependent on the type of game (DSS or DSO). We
ran a mixed-effects linear model (subject as random effect)
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Table 2: Mixed-effects logistic model of equilibrium re-
sponse, with subject as random effect and the proportions
of the five types of transitions as independent variables
Equilibrium
response
B SE z p 95 % CI
Own-payoffs
within-action
−0.07 0.09 −0.77 .439 -0.25 0.11
Own-payoffs
between-action
0.07 0.08 0.90 .366 -0.08 0.22
Other-payoffs
within-action
0.42 0.08 4.98 <.001 0.25 0.58
Other-payoffs
between-action
0.10 0.07 1.43 .153 -0.04 0.24
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Figure 4: Boxplots of strategic IQ by CRT score.
to identify potential interaction effects between the game
type and the five types of relevant payoff transitions. Re-
sults do not show any effect of game type in any of the five
types of relevant transitions (Table A2 and A3 in section A.3,
Appendices). These results are in line with previous findings
(Polonio et al., 2015), suggesting that the visual analysis of
the game matrix is modulated by top-down attentional mech-
anisms that are independent of the current payoff structure.
For this reason, henceforth gaze patterns will be analyzed
independently of the type of game.
In order to identify the attentional indices able to predict
Table 3: Multivariate regression with the average proportion
of five types of relevant transitions as dependent variable and
CRT score as independent variable.
Proportion of
transitions
B SE z p 95 % CI
Own within-action −0.09 0.15 −0.60 .549 −0.38 0.21
Own between-action 0.05 0.15 0.31 .758 −0.25 0.34
Other within-action 0.46 0.13 3.54 .001 0.20 0.73
Other between-action 0.00 0.15 0.02 .981 −0.29 0.30
Intra-cell −0.03 0.15 −0.18 .854 −0.32 0.27
N. obs. 48
strategic sophistication, we ran a mixed-effects logistic re-
gression with equilibrium response as dependent variable,
the proportions of the five types of transition as indepen-
dent variables and subject as random effect. Results of the
model (Table 2) show that strategic behavior is accompa-
nied by a higher proportion of other-payoffs within-action
transitions (B = 0.42, p < .001) and a lower proportion of
intra-cell transitions (B = −0.21, p =.025). The implemen-
tation of other-payoffs within-action transitions reflects the
attempt at forming precise beliefs about the opponent’s move
by computing the expected value of each of her two poten-
tial actions. This is consistent with the expected behavior
of a level-2 player that best responds to the belief that the
counterpart is level-1. Intra-cell transitions are consistent
with the visual analysis of players who aim to coordinate
with the counterpart on a cooperative solution and disregard
dominant choices of the two players (Polonio et al., 2015).
2.3.4 CRT and gaze patterns
One of the main goals of the present work is to understand
whether cognitive reflection modulates the implementation
of gaze patterns underlying the construction of sophisticated
game representations. We ran a multivariate regression with
our five types of transitions as dependent variables and CRT
as independent variable. Results show that CRT score pre-
dicted the mean proportion of other-payoffs within-action
transitions (R2 = .21, F = 12.50, B = 0.46, p = .001, signifi-
cant at Bonferroni-corrected threshold. See Table 3), which
we have previously shown to predict the rate of equilibrium
choices.9
In order to explore the cognitive specificity of this effect,
we also ran stepwise backward regressions including our
fluid intelligence measures and working memory measures
9Results did not change if excluding from the model influential obser-
vations (=2) identified by values of Cook’s D > 4/n (Effect of CRT score
on other-payoffs within-action transitions: B = 0.46, p = 0.001. No other
significant effects found).
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Figure 5: Temporal evolution of proportion of own and
other’s payoffs fixations for each CRT level. In each trial,
we assigned fixations to five time intervals containing the
same number of fixations Trial-by-trial proportions of fixa-
tions were averaged for each participant and then individual
time courses were averaged across participants. Filled areas
around lines represent between-subject standard error of the
mean (see section A.2 of the Appendices for an exhaustive
description of the temporal analysis of fixations).
as independent variables. Results indicate that measures of
fluid intelligence and working memory do not have any im-
pact on the average proportion of the five types of relevant
transitions (APM, digit span forward and digit span back-
ward: p > .05). Results are identical when running the same
analyses separately for DSS (effect on other-payoffs within-
action transition — CRT: B = 0.44, p = .002; APM, digit
span forward and digit span backward: p > .05; no other
effects on transition types) and DSO (effect on other-payoffs
within-action transition — CRT: B = 0.45, p = .001; APM,
digit span forward and digit span backward: p > .05; no
other effects on transition types), suggesting that cognitive
reflection regulates top-down attentional mechanisms that in
turn modulates the visual exploration of game matrices.
Figure 5 shows the time course of the distribution of at-
tention between own and other’s payoffs separately for each
cognitive reflection level. Low CRT players (CRT = 0) re-
mained primarily focused on their own payoffs during the
entire time course of the game. Conversely, high CRT play-
ers (CRT = 3) started focusing on own payoffs, then moved
to evaluating incentives of their counterpart, and finally they
observed again their own payoffs in order to best respond
to the opponent’s predicted action. This pattern is consis-
tent with the temporal analysis exhibited by strategic players
reported in Polonio et al. (2015).
Results of a mixed-effects linear regression confirmed that
the CRT level modulates the selective increase of other’s
player fixations in the middle section of the trial (B = 0.40,
p = .031) and not at the start and at the end of the trial,
when attention is mainly focused on players’ own incentives
for every CRT level (Start: B = 0.01, p = .942; End: B =
0.13, p = .492). Crucially, the increase in the magnitude of
attention towards the counterpart’s incentives between the
initial and the middle part of the trial predicts the proportion
of equilibrium responses in DSO games (B = 0.38, p = .008.
See Section A.2 of the Appendices for a full description of
the temporal analysis). Results of the temporal analysis show
that cognitive reflection modulates the players’ tendency to
switch attention towards the counterpart’s incentives after an
initial exploration of their own incentives.
2.3.5 CRT, gaze patterns and strategic choices: media-
tion analysis
In the previous paragraphs, we have shown three main re-
sults:
• Visual patterns of information acquisition predicts
strategic sophistication in 2x2 games.
• Cognitive reflection predicts strategic sophistication in
2x2 games.
• Cognitive reflection predicts visual patterns of informa-
tion acquisition in 2x2 games.
Afterwards, we asked whether the relationship between
cognitive reflection and strategic sophistication was medi-
ated by visual analysis. We considered only DSO games
since we have previously shown that in these matrices the
CRT level affects both visual analysis and choices, while in
DSS games the CRT score does not modulate equilibrium
choices, leaving no room for a mediation effect. To test for
the presence of a mediation effect, we ran an additional lin-
ear regression with proportion of equilibrium responses as
dependent variable and CRT score and proportion of other-
payoffs within-action transitions as independent variables
(Table A4 in section A.3, Appendices). Interestingly, the
effect of CRT on equilibrium responses (observed in Table
1) disappears after including the proportion of other-payoffs
within-action transitions as independent variable, indicating
full mediation of visual analysis on the relationship between
cognitive reflection and strategic sophistication. The medi-
ated effect was tested for significance using the “Mediation”
R package (Imai et al., 2010). Confidence intervals were
calculated using the bias-corrected and accelerated boot-
strap method (BCa) (Di Ciccio & Efron, 1996), a procedure
specifically recommended in mediation analysis (Preacher &
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Table 4: Results of Causal Mediation Analysis with proportion of other-payoffs within-action transitions as a mediator, CRT
score as independent variable and proportion of equilibrium responses as dependent variable. Only DSO games were con-
sidered for this analysis.
Effect Estimated coefficient 95% CI lower bound 95% CI upper bound p
Average causal mediation effect (ACME) 0.19 0.07 0.39 .002
Average direct effect (ADE) 0.14 -0.13 0.37 .295
Total effect 0.33 0.04 0.57 .021
Proportion mediated 0.58 0.27 5.56 .023
Hayes, 2008). As expected, the average causal mediation ef-
fect of proportion of other-payoffs within-action transitions
on the relation between CRT score and proportion of equi-
librium responses is statistically significant (p = .002, based
on 10000 bootstrap samples), accounting for an estimated 58
% of the total effect between CRT score and proportion of
equilibrium responses (Table 4).
2.4 Summary
In Experiment 1, we have shown that cognitive reflection is
closely associated with strategic behavior in one-shot 2x2
matrix games. First, the CRT score predicts the free pa-
rameter g, expressing the hierarchical level of sophistication
in the Cognitive Hierarchy model, as well as the proportion
of equilibrium choices in dominance-solvable games requir-
ing strategic sophistication and the Strategic IQ. Crucially,
the CRT score predicts also the type of visual analysis em-
ployed in the same games. High CRT players performed a
higher proportion of other-payoffs within-action transitions,
reflecting the attempt at forming precise (non-diffuse) be-
liefs about the choice of the counterpart. The emergence of
this pattern of information acquisition completely mediates
the relationship between cognitive reflection and the level of
sophistication of choices.
In order to understand the generalizability of these effects,
in Experiment 2 we explored the relationships between cog-
nitive reflection, gaze patterns and strategic choices in matrix
games characterized by a more complex payoff structure.
3 Experiment 2
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Participants and procedure
Participants were other 48 students from the University of
Trento, Italy (27 females, mean age 23, SD 3.16). Partici-
pants performed fourteen 3x3 one-shot matrix games. We
used the 14 games reported in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker
(2008).10 All games have a unique Nash equilibrium and
do not have salient payoffs. Ten of these games are solvable
in two, three, or four steps of iterated dominance,11 while
four games have unique Nash equilibrium without dominant
strategies.
Before playing the games, participants were instructed on
the procedure and were provided with examples and training
trials (4 games). Moreover, control questions were admin-
istered to verify that task and procedure of payment had
been fully understood by participants. If participants failed
to answer control questions, instructions were repeated un-
til participant’s full comprehension (we report detailed in-
structions and control questionnaires in section C.1 of the
Appendices). The order of games was randomized across
participants. Each trial was preceded by a fixation-point po-
sitioned in one of four possible locations outside the symbol
space.
All participants played in the role of row player and were
instructed to choose between row I, row II and row III by key-
press.12 Each game was played only once and no feedback
was provided at the end of games. At the end of the fourteen
games, three games were randomly selected and the player’s
choice in each game was paired with the choice of another
player in that game. Participants received the sum of the
outcomes of the three games in euros (from 3.1 to 29 euros).
Moreover, participants completed the Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test (CRT) with the same items used in Experiment 1.
We did not collect other control measures of fluid intelli-
gence and working memory, since we have already shown
that the effect of reflection, as measured by the CRT, on
10For the full game list, see Figure B1 in section B1, Appendices
11Four Games are dominance solvable with two rounds of dominance;
five games are dominance solvable with three rounds of dominance; one
game is dominance solvable with four rounds of dominance.
12In order to pair each participant with an opponent, the 14 games in-
cluded seven pairs of isomorphic games. Isomorphic games are equivalent
in the sense that the second game of each pair is identical to the first except
for transposing the players’ roles, changing the order of the three actions
(for both players), and adding or subtracting a small constant amount from
the payoffs of each game. In this way, it was possible to match the choices
of row players as they have played in two different roles.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 2, March 2020 Gaze patterns and CRT in strategic interaction 239
strategic choices or gaze patterns in one-shot matrix games
does not seem to be driven by fluid intelligence or working
memory.
3.1.2 Eye-tracking procedure and gaze data analysis
The eye-tracking procedure was identical to the one used in
Experiment 1.
Concerning gaze data analysis, we defined 18 regions of
interest (ROIs) centered on the matrix payoffs. All the ROIs
had a circular shape with a size of 36000 pixels, did not over-
lap and covered 38.8 % of the game matrix area. However,
the large majority of fixations (86 %) fell inside the ROIs.
All the fixations falling outside the ROIs were discarded.
The same gaze variables of Experiment 1 (own and other’s
payoffs fixations; five types of between-payoffs transitions)
were used for eye-tracking analysis in Experiment 2.13
3.2 Hypotheses
In Experiment 2, we asked whether the effects observed
in Experiment 1 could generalize to more complex payoff
structures (3x3). In this regard, recent evidence (Costa-
Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008) has shown that players rarely
reach equilibrium in these complex games; rather, they usu-
ally implement a maximum of two steps of strategic thinking
(level-2) (Polonio & Coricelli, 2019). We do not expect play-
ers to regularly play the equilibrium strategy, and the most
sophisticated model of choice employed by players should
be level-2, which assumes the counterpart to be a level-1
player. We therefore expect the CRT score to be associated
with higher levels of strategic thinking (i.e., level-2), and
with a higher proportion of level-2 choices.
As in Experiment 1, we hypothesize that the behavior of
high CRT players translates in visual patterns of information
acquisition meant to predict the opponent’s move: in partic-
ular, sophisticated players should exhibit a higher proportion
of other-payoff within-action transitions, reflecting the at-
tempt at predicting the action with the highest average payoff
for the opponent (Bhatt & Camerer, 2005; Costa-Gomes et
al., 2001; Devetag et al., 2016; Polonio & Coricelli, 2019).
Finally, we expect sophistication in the visual analysis of the
game matrix to mediate the relationship between cognitive
reflection and strategic choices.
13As in Experiment 1, a fixation was defined as an interval in which gaze
was focused within 1◦ of visual angle for at least 100 ms (Manor & Gordon,
2003). The proportion of transitions that did not fall in any of the five type
of relevant transition was quite high (55 %) but did not correlate with the
proportion of equilibrium (Spearman’s r = 0.06, p = 0.69) and L2 (r =−0.17,
p = 0.24) responses, confirming that they express payoff comparisons that
are not crucial for strategy generation and game resolution.
Table 5: Average proportion of choices in accordance with
each of the three common models of choice (Level-1 (L1),
Level-2 (L2) and Nash Equilibrium (Nash).
Behavioral model of choice
Game ID L1 L2 Nash
2 steps of iterated
dominance
1 0.40 0.29 0.29
3 0.69 0.21 0.21
5 0.56 0.35 0.35





2 0.50 0.25 0.50
4 0.75 0.75 0.25
6 0.90 0.90 0.10
8 0.58 0.58 0.58
9 0.71 0.25 0.71




11 0.58 0.35 0.35
12 0.71 0.71 0.21
13 0.73 0.23 0.73
14 0.50 0.38 0.13
0.63 0.42 0.35
All 0.60 0.42 0.36
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Behavioral results
In Table 5, we report the proportion of choices in accor-
dance with three common models of choice: level-1 (L1),
level-2 (L2) and Nash equilibrium. Consistently with pre-
vious results (Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008; Polonio
& Coricelli, 2019), the model that best explains the average
behavior of players, in every class of game, is L1, while
players play the Nash equilibrium barely above chance level.
In the next paragraph, we will explore whether and how cog-
nitive reflection can account for heterogeneity in strategic
sophistication.
3.3.2 CRT and strategic sophistication
As in Experiment 1, we estimated the parameter g of each of
the four CRT groups to investigate whether the CRT score
is associated with the level of strategic thinking predicted
by the Cognitive Hierarchy model. As in the previous ex-
periment, higher CRT levels are associated with higher g
parameters (CRT = 0, g = 0.59; CRT = 1, g = 1.40; CRT = 2,
g = 1.12; CRT = 3, g = 1.54), suggesting a close association
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Table 6: For each of the four CRT levels, we report the pa-
rameter g (CH), which reflects the average number of steps of
strategic thinking in the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model, and
the average proportion of L2 responses. Values in brackets
represent between-subject standard deviations.
CRT score N g (CH) Avg. proportion of L2 responses
CRT = 0 14 0.59 0.32 (0.11)
CRT = 1 9 1.40 0.42 (0.15)
CRT = 2 8 1.12 0.41 (0.23)
CRT = 3 17 1.54 0.52 (0.19)
between cognitive reflection and level of strategic sophisti-
cation (Table 6). We can see that g levels are lower than the
ones observed in Experiment 1, as expected by the higher
complexity of the games. Specifically, the CRT group with
the highest average g (CRT = 3) exhibited a level of strate-
gic thinking between L1 and L2, confirming that in these
games players generally implement a maximum of two steps
of strategic thinking. For this reason, we will use the pro-
portion of L2 responses as a behavioral measure of level of
sophistication in the next analyses. The proportion of L2
choices in 3x3 games was indeed modulated by CRT score
(Linear regression, R2 = 0.17, F (1, 46) = 9.48, B = 0.41, p
= 0.003).14 Results do not change when excluding from the
model influential observations (= 3) with values of Cook’s
D > 4/n. (R2 = 0.22, F (1, 43) = 12.05, B = 0.38, p = 0.001).
Average proportions of L2 responses for each CRT level are
reported in Table 6 and visualized in Figure B2 (left panel)
in section B.2 of the Appendices.
In Experiment 1, we found that high CRT score (CRT
= 3) was associated with a higher level of Strategic IQ. In
Experiment 2, we do not observe any association between
CRT score and Strategic IQ (R2 = 0.04, F (1, 46) = 1.71,
B = 0.19, p = .197, see Figure B2, right panel, in section
B.2 of the Appendices). The absence of a significant effect
in Experiment 2 could be explained by the increase of the
strategy space in 3x3 games. In fact, in 2x2 games, the
L2 strategy constitutes a best response to both L1 and L2
strategies; since the minimum number of steps of strategic
thinking observed in 2x2 games is one (L1), the L2 strategy
expresses a best response to the large majority of potential
opponents in the population. Therefore, players closer to
level-2 (CRT = 3) exhibit a higher Strategic IQ. Conversely,
in our 3x3 games, the L2 model of choice does not constitute
a best response to a L2 or a L0 counterpart and the L2 strategy
is not always efficient given the actual distribution of types
of players in the population. In other words, in 3x3 games,
14The same analysis did not return any significant results when using the
proportion of equilibrium responses as dependent variable (R2 = 0.02, F (1,
46) = 1.15, B = 0.15, p = .290, Table B1 in section B.2 Appendices). This
can be easily explained by the low rate of equilibrium responses.
the heterogeneity of the population’s strategy space might
have prevented high CRT players from best responding to a
high ratio of potential opponents, and from increasing their
Strategic IQ significantly.
3.3.3 Gaze patterns and choices
First, we asked whether the visual analysis is influenced by
the type of game (2-steps, 3–4 steps, no dominance). We ran
a repeated-measures ANOVA with proportion of transitions
as dependent variable and type of transition and type of
game as independent repeated factors in order to test for the
presence of an interaction effect. Results reveal an effect
of type of transition (F (4, 376) = 14.79, p < .001) and no
effects of type or game (F (2, 376) = 0.92, p = 0.403) or
game-transition interaction (F (8, 376) = 0.96, p = 0.466).15
These results corroborate results of Experiment 1 showing
no effect of the game structure on the scan path implemented
by participants to analyze matrices. For this reason, gaze
patterns will be analyzed independently of the type of game
henceforth.
Replicating results of Experiment 1, higher levels of strate-
gic sophistication were accompanied by a higher proportion
of other-payoffs within-action transitions (Mixed-model lo-
gistic regression of L2 response B = 0.67, p < .001, Table
B4 in section B.2, Appendices). Additionally, we observe an
effect of own-payoffs between-action transitions (B = 0.22,
p = .019).16 The higher proportion of own-payoffs between-
action transitions is consistent with the expected and ob-
served visual pattern of information acquisition of strategic
players (Polonio & Coricelli, 2019) who, after having formed
beliefs about the expected action of the opponent, best re-
spond to this prediction by looking at their own payoffs within
the expected counterpart’s action.17 These results confirm
that exploring the incentives of the counterpart and integrat-
ing them in a comprehensive representation of the game is
crucial to exhibit more sophisticated models of choice, as
L2.
3.3.4 CRT and gaze patterns
We tested whether the CRT score predicted visual patterns of
information acquisition also in 3x3 games. Consistently with
results of Experiment 1, CRT score specifically predicts the
mean proportion of other-payoffs within-action transitions
among the five relevant transitions (Multivariate regression,
15We report descriptive statistics of gaze pattern across classes of games
in Table B2 in section B.2, Appendices.
16As expected, given the low proportion of equilibrium responses in our
sample, we did not find any effect of type of payoff transitions on the rate
of equilibrium responses (Table B3 in section B.2, Appendices)
17The absence of an effect of own-payoffs between-action transitions in
Experiment 1 corroborate previous results (Devetag et al. 2016; Polonio
& Coricelli, 2019) showing that an increase in the action space (as in 3x3
matrices) results in a more precise characterization of the gaze patterns
underlying the decision process implemented by the participants.
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Figure 6: Temporal evolution of the distribution of attention
between own and other’s payoffs fixation by CRT level. Tem-
poral windows were defined using the same method of Ex-
periment 1 (see section A.2 in the Appendices) Filled areas
represent between-subject standard errors of the mean.
B = 0.37, p = .009, F (1, 46) = 7.48, R2 = 0.14, significant
at Bonferroni-corrected threshold. See Table B5 in section
B.2, Appendices). Results hold even if excluding influential
observations (n = 3) with values of Cook’s D > 4/n (B = 0.41,
p = .001). Moreover, we report an almost significant trend of
the CRT score on the proportion of other-payoffs between-
action transitions (B = 0.27, p = .059), which reaches signif-
icance when excluding from the model influential observa-
tions (Cook’s D > 4/n, B = 0.36, p = .009).18 Other-payoffs
between-action transitions are relevant in the visual analysis
of the payoff matrix since are necessary to spot relationships
of dominance between the actions of the counterpart and
apply recursive steps of strategic thinking in complex 3 x 3
payoff structures (Polonio & Coricelli, 2019).
We also analyzed the time course of the distribution of
attention between own and other’s payoffs across CRT lev-
els. As shown in Figure 6, low CRT players were primarily
focused on their own payoffs during the entire time course
of the game. Conversely, high CRT players started focus-
ing on own payoffs, then increased their level of attention
towards the payoff of the counterpart and eventually they
focused again their own payoffs in order to best respond to
the opponent’s predicted action.
The temporal pattern of high CRT players is less neat
18No other differences in terms of relationship between gaze patterns and
CRT score were found when controlling for influence statistics.
than the one observed in Experiment 1, probably due to the
increased complexity of the payoff structures that pushes
players to focus more on own payoffs and play less sophis-
ticated strategies in 3x3 games. In fact, low CRT players
largely ignored the counterpart’s incentives along the entire
time course of the trial. Coherently, results of a mixed-effect
linear model indeed show the CRT score modulates the rate
of attention towards other’s payoffs not only in the middle
part of the trial (B = 0.46, p = .007), but also at the beginning
(B = 0.50, p = .003) and almost significantly in the final part
of the trial (B = 0.33, p = .052).19
3.3.5 CRT, gaze patterns and strategic choices: media-
tion analysis
Finally, we aimed to replicate findings from Experiment 1,
showing an effect of full mediation of game visual analysis
on the relationship between cognitive reflection and sophis-
tication of choices.
We ran a linear regression with mean proportion of L2
response as dependent variable and CRT score and propor-
tion of other-payoffs within-action transitions as independent
variables (Table B6 in section B.2, Appendices). As in Ex-
periment 1, the effect of CRT on the proportion of strategic
(L2) responses disappears after including in the model the
proportion of other-payoffs within-action transitions, indi-
cating full mediation of game visual analysis on the rela-
tionship between cognitive reflection and strategic choices.
The average causal mediation effect of proportion of other-
payoffs within-action transitions on the relation between
CRT score and proportion of L2 responses is statistically
significant (p = .003, based on 10000 bootstrap samples, bias-
corrected and accelerated bootstrap method), accounting for
an estimated 68% of the total effect between CRT score and
L2 responses (Table B7 in section B.2, Appendices).
3.4 Summary
Experiment 2 replicated results of Experiment 1 using games
characterized by increased relational complexity of the pay-
off structure. As in the previous experiment, a high CRT
score is associated with the tendency to take into consider-
ation other’s incentives to form beliefs about her expected
action, and predicts the implementation of more sophisti-
cated models of choice (closer to level-2 of the Cognitive
Hierarchy model). Moreover, the relationship between cog-
nitive abilities and strategic choices is entirely driven by the
mediating effect of the type of visual analysis implemented.
19The temporal analysis of fixations in Experiment 2 was identical to the
one conducted in Experiment 1 (see section A.2 in the Appendices).
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4 Discussion
In two eye-tracking experiments, we found that cognitive re-
flection can predict the ability to take into account others’
incentives in the visual exploration of the payoff matrix. This
visual analysis is fundamental since it reflects the attempt
to predict other’s actions and respond to such predictions,
which we can consider as the hallmark of strategic behavior.
High levels of cognitive reflection also explain the imple-
mentation of a higher number of steps of strategic thinking
in the decision process, in the framework of Level-k and
Cognitive Hierarchy theories. Interestingly, the relationship
between cognitive reflection and strategic choices is com-
pletely mediated by gaze patterns, suggesting a precise role
for cognitive reflection and game representation mechanisms
in explaining strategic behavior.
The association between cognitive reflection and lookup
patterns suggests that one cause of unsophisticated strate-
gic behavior is the failure to process and represent relevant
information accurately. Specifically, individuals character-
ized by an unreflective cognitive style tend to disregard those
payoff comparisons that are necessary to form beliefs about
the action of the counterpart and therefore engage in strate-
gic recursive reasoning. Individual cognitive style therefore
modulates attentional mechanisms sub-serving one of the
core components of mentalizing, namely the understanding
of others’ preferences (Bilancini et al., 2018). However,
this does not imply that low CRT players are unable to at-
tribute mental states to others; rather, it suggests that cog-
nitive reflection modulates top-down attentional process of
information search and representation necessary to correctly
integrate others’ incentives in the model of the opponent’s
decision space. When the complexity of this cognitive opera-
tion is high, low CRT agents may implement behavioral rules
that simplify the relational structure of the problem (Devetag
& Warglien, 2008; Pantelis & Kennedy, 2017). For instance,
they may focus primarily on own payoffs (Evans & Krueger,
2014), as suggested by the increased bias towards own payoff
in in Experiment 2.
Our results can be easily interpreted in the framework
of dual-process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein
et al., 1996; Gawronski & Creighton, 2013; Kahneman,
2003; Sloman,1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack and
Deutsch, 2004; Evans, 2008), which explain heterogeneity in
decision making in terms of reliance on deliberative and in-
tuitive cognitive systems (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). In these
terms, cognitive reflection expresses the individual tendency
to rely more or less on one or the other system (Osman,
2004). Nonetheless, the implementation of unsophisticated
strategies in one-shot games may depend on the tendency
to initially rely on intuitive processing until errors or ineffi-
ciency are detected by the deliberative system (Evans, 1984,
2006; Kahneman, 2003; Travers et al., 2016). This hypothe-
sis is supported by results of Experiment 1 showing that the
cognitive reflection level modulates the players’ tendency to
switch attention towards the counterpart’s incentives after an
initial exploration of their own payoffs.
Nevertheless, this interpretation does not entail that low
CRT players are unable to build more exhaustive representa-
tion of the interactive decision and to use more sophisticated
models of choice. In fact, recent findings (Zonca et al.,
2019a) have shown that players using unsophisticated vi-
sual analyses and models of choice (i.e., L1 players) can
switch gaze patterns and choice towards more sophisticated
behavior after exposure to alternative models of choice. In
the same way, unreflective players may abandon their ini-
tial unsophisticated strategy and increase their level of so-
phistication after feedback that reveals the inefficiency of
their current behavior or the existence of more sophisticated
strategies (Verbrugge et al. 2018).
Moreover, our findings highlight a crucial component of
the concept of “strategic awareness” advanced by Fehr &
Huck (2016). Specifically, the authors suggested that out-of-
equilibrium behavior is driven by the lack of understanding
of the interactive nature of the game: we indeed propose
that a potential cause of this awareness lies in the failure to
process task-relevant information exhaustively.
We also found that the visual analysis sustaining the con-
struction of game representations appears to completely me-
diate the relationship between cognitive reflection and strate-
gic choices. This finding is important since it discloses the
nature of this effect, widely reported in recent studies explor-
ing the link between game playing and cognitive abilities
(Akiyama et al., 2017; Brañas-Garza et al., 2012; Carpenter
et al., 2013; Fehr & Huck, 2016; Kiss et al., 2016; Georganas
et al., 2015). Cognitive reflection does not directly affect
choices, but rather influences mechanisms of encoding and
representation of relevant information in the payoff matrix,
which in turn predict sophistication in choices. Moreover,
this finding offers new insight about the role of cognitive
reflection and representation-building in higher cognition,
given that the CRT has been found to predict behavior in sev-
eral decision-making (Brañas-Garza et al., 2012; Campitelli
& Labollita, 2010; Graffeo et al., 2015; Toplak et al., 2011),
learning (Don et al., 2016) and reasoning (Hoppe & Kus-
terer, 2011; Oechssler et al., 2009) tasks. In particular, these
results support the idea that the effect of cognitive reflection
on complex tasks may reside in its effect of processes of
search, encoding and representation of task-relevant infor-
mation, as suggested in previous studies (Cokely & Kelley,
2009; Sirota et al., 2014; Zonca et al., 2019b).
Taken together, our results stress the importance of pro-
cesses of representation generation for understanding strate-
gic behavior (Devetag & Warglien, 2008), and ground the
sophistication of such processes in the use of rich or miserly
information processing, as assessed by individual levels of
cognitive reflection. Nonetheless, other cognitive processes
may intervene in determining sophistication in interactive
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decisions. For example, use of recursive thinking might in-
fluence performance in games like the Beauty Contest game
(Mazzocco et al, 2013), and forward or backward induc-
tion may be necessary in multi-step games. Working mem-
ory abilities might influence strategic behavior in repeated
games, where information about previous trials must be re-
called and integrated with novel information. Furthermore,
social motives might intervene in the decision process and
influence the expected utility of players with other-regarding
preferences, who aim to maximize joint, rather than individ-
uals, outcomes (Devetag et al., 2016; Polonio & Coricelli,
2019). We hope that our results could fuel further research
into the role of cognitive processes and social motives in
explaining strategic behavior in interactive settings.
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